

Radicalization Prevention Policies from the Perspective of Deliberative Public Policy Theory

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This study elucidates preventing radicalization approach from the deliberative perspective. This research discusses about preventing extremist group attack for the future. The method of this research is descriptive qualitative. Data collection methods in this research consisted of observation, interviews, and documentation. Research findings showed that the preventing radicalization basic on hard approach combine to soft approach which is the influence of Polri and government actors was powerful instead non-governmental actors were not involved in policy formulation. in deliberative perspective that citizens contribute to effective radicalization prevention policies through cooperation, decision making and providing information to the government.

Keywords: Counter Radicalization, Deliberative, Policy Network.

1. Introduction

The discussion of research results used relevant theories and concepts to analyze radicalization prevention policies from the perspective of deliberative policy theory and policy networks concept. Radicalization is a process where people adopt extreme systems, including the desire to use and facilitate crime to promote an ideology, political project, or cause as a means of social transformation (Center for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence, 2018).

The National Police of Indonesia (2019) released a list of suspected terrorists with letter Number DTTOT/P-2a/ 936 /V/2016, based on the Determination of the Chairman of the Central Jakarta District Court Number: 432/Pen.Pid/2016/PN.Jkt, concerning the Determination of the Extension of Individuals and Organizations Listing as Suspected Terrorists consisted of Jama'ah Islamiyah, Al Haramain Foundation Indonesia, Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid, Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia, Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia. Meanwhile, the terrorist networks currently active in Indonesia are Jamaah Islamiyah and Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia.

Global Terrorism Index data 2023 shows that most countries in the world have been targets of criminal acts of terrorism and Indonesia is in medium impacted category. At this case is Poso Regency was in conflict on 1998 to 2000 and after the conflict escalation then Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia (MIT) came. Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia is an extremist group who created terror in Poso. There are four target groups for terrorism prevention strategies in Indonesia, namely: a) the core group or intellectual actors, namely key figures who recruit people to become militants; b) militant groups or executors who are trained to carry out terror, c) supporting groups, namely individuals or groups that voluntarily provide supporting facilities for acts of terrorism, as well as d) sympathizer groups that have the potential to support terrorist movements (BNPT Deputy I Strategic Plan 2010-2014). The Poso government should concentrate on efforts to prevent radicalization among these four target groups. This research discusses about preventing extremist group attack for the future.

2. Materials and Methods

The method of this research is descriptive qualitative, by conducting interviews with the government, community and non-profit organizations. In descriptive research, researchers carried out a description of the relationship between an event to get a complete figure of the phenomenon that occurred concerning the research problems. Data sources came from informants, events, and documents related to the research topic.

A. Data Collection Method

Data collection methods in this research consisted of observation, interviews, and documentation. Furthermore, data analysis techniques used Soft System Methodology (SSM) developed by Peter Checkland, including situations considered problematic, problem situations expressed, root definitions of relevant systems, conceptual models, comparisons with reality, and debate about change.

B. Counter Radicalization in Poso Regency (2000-2023)

The counter radicalization in Poso Regency was start after Poso Conflict (Ali, 2016; Asrori, 2016; Cinu, 2016). Policies for preventing and handling radicalization in Poso Regency are elitist or determined by elites at the central and regional levels. The counter radicalization approach implemented since 2000 because of the social conflict and handling Mujahidin extremist group in 2012 to 2023 by security operation which can be seen in the following table:

Security policy approach in Poso Regency 2000-2023

Early Detection	Security Operations	Deradicalization
The roles of Indonesian police intelligence and the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI)	Maleo Operation 2012 to 2015, Tinombala Operation 2016 to 2020 and Madago Raya Operation 2021 to 2023.	Deradicalization of former Poso terrorists.

The table above indicates that the radicalization prevention policy still prioritizes a hard approach through early detection, security operations, and deradicalization. In addition to security operations, the Poso Regency regional government issued the Decree of the Regent of Poso Number 188.45/0474/2021 concerning the Formation of an Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict at the Poso Regency Level in 2021. The action plan document contains the prevention stopping prominent social conflicts and terrorism on a provincial scale across authorities by the integrated Poso Regency team (Lahada et al., 2023).

However, the action plan document does not contain details about preventing radicalization under Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, which is further explained in Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning the Prevention of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and Protection of Investigators, General Prosecutors, Judges and Correctional Officers.

The action plan document should contain three main aspects preventing radicalization, namely first, doing national preparedness by empowering the community, increasing the capacity of apparatus, protecting and improving infrastructure, developing terrorism studies, and mapping vulnerable areas of extremist radical ideology. Second, counter-radicalization through counter-narrative, counter-propaganda, and counter ideology. Third, deradicalization is done for former etremist.

C. Deliberative Policy Perspective

A deliberative model policy initiated by Grimble and Wellard (1997) and Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) favors output as the core of public policy. Deliberative policy uses a democratic system with a degree of stakeholder intervention ranging from very dominant to very loose. Huda (2019) states that systematic efforts must be made to stop the spread of terrorist narratives to counter radical groups' narratives, ideology, and propaganda, eliminate the influence of radical content, and replace it with information, knowledge, and peaceful messages of tolerance. Sutrimo et al., (2016) mentions that deradicalization policies must be implemented through ongoing supervision and guidance of former terrorism convicts involving religious figures with socio-economic and religious approaches.

Deliberative policies are formulated through an intensive discussion between the government and its citizens. In essence, every policy formulation must be communicated and involve all elements and citizens who also bear the policy consequences (Amy and Thompson, 2004). In this deliberative model, the public administration functions more as a facilitator. Indeed, there is an inherent weakness: the process is often longer and more drawn out. In this case, public administration is challenged to develop stakeholder mapping (identification and analysis) capacity, invite stakeholder representation (based on mapping results), and, if necessary, also act as an empowerer for stakeholder groups that, according to analysis, are still in need (Mardiyanta, 2011). This research analyzed the problems using Carson and Hartz-Karp (2005) deliberative public policy theory: inclusion, deliberative, and influence

criteria.

However, the action plan document does not contain details about preventing radicalization under Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism, which is further explained in Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning the prevention of criminal acts of terrorism and protection of investigators, general prosecutors, judges and correctional officers, namely national preparedness, counter-radicalization and deradicalization.

The Action Plan Document should contain three main aspects in preventing radicalization, namely first, doing national preparedness by empowering the community, increasing the capacity of apparatus, protecting and improving infrastructure, developing terrorism studies, and mapping vulnerable areas of terrorism radical ideology. Second, counter-radicalization through counter-narrative, counter-propaganda, and counter ideology. Third, deradicalization is done for former terrorists or groups of people who adhere to extremist beliefs through activities to foster national insight, religious insight, and entrepreneurship.

1. Inclusion

Efforts to handle social conflict and terrorism in Poso Regency are under the Decree of the Regent of Poso Number 188.45/0474/2021 concerning the Formation of an Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict at the Poso Regency Level in 2021. The decree states that the actors interested in the terrorism handling policy in Poso only consist of governmental actors, which are the executive, legislative, and judiciary. It means that preventing radicalization is dominated by government actors. Meanwhile, non-governmental actors such as the Communication Forum of Inter-Religious Communities (FKUB), academics, media, and the Poso former terrorist community are only involved as participants in interfaith meetings and dialogues to provide suggestions and input for the government. In fact, deliberative democracy seeks to change government policies through argumentative discussions and joint assessments of citizens as elements who feel the impact of policies (Amy and Thompson, 2004).

In efforts to prevent radicalization in Poso, non-governmental stakeholders consist of the Central Sulawesi Terrorism Prevention Coordination Forum (FKPT), the Poso Regency Communication Forum of Inter-Religious Communities (FKUB), academics, NGOs, the media, and the Poso former terrorist community. The role of these stakeholders is to channel community aspirations in the form of recommendations and provide scientific studies related to government programs in efforts to eradicate terrorism,

Ragazzi (2014) and Lindekille (2014) argue that citizens can contribute to effective radicalization prevention policies through cooperation, providing information to the government, and not getting involved with radical groups. In the radicalization prevention program in Poso Regency, apart from taking a legal approach, it was necessary to prioritize a soft approach through programs that could increase participation from all levels of society and citizens.

2. Deliberation

The deliberation process is an open dialogue that requires exchanging information and mutual respect for differences of opinion among deliberation participants to reach a mutual

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agreement. The deliberation on preventing radicalization in Poso Regency is dominated by governmental actors consisting of the BNPT and the Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflicts in Poso Regency. The government is the only actor who formulates policies and makes decisions. Meanwhile, non-governmental actors: FKUB Poso, FKPT Central Sulawesi, academics, and former terrorist convicts are not decision makers. However, in Fung's (2003) and Cornwall's (2007) view, citizen participation is generally required in deliberations that discuss public interests.

Deliberative public policy is a derivation of the concept of deliberative democracy put forward by Jurgen Habermas. Deliberative democracy wants to increase the intensity of citizen participation in forming aspirations and opinions so that the policies and laws produced by the governing party can come closer to the expectations of the governed (Mardiyanta, 2011, pp. 261–271). Majority decisions in deliberative democracy can be controlled through citizen sovereignty. Consensus deliberation is a concept that is interpreted as involving citizens in voicing their preferences rationally, listening to each other, empathizing, and exchanging information openly to make decisions on issues faced by society through accountable arguments. Besides promoting conciliation between various actors and public involvement, deliberative processes offer transparency, public perspective, legitimacy, and decision-making accountability (Abitraningrum, 2016).

Khan and Kiran (2016) mention that to overcome radicalization, the government must implement 1) a three-pronged strategy, namely doing political dialogue between stakeholders, carrying out socioeconomic reforms, and taking action against radical groups, 2) counter-radicalization campaigns, 3) media control. The actor interaction must occur equally, intensively, and interface in formulating participatory public policy. The community must be actively involved in policy formulation because the community is the part that bears the consequences of the policies made. Community involvement should not only provide input to local government but also be given space in program preparation and decision-making to prevent radicalization in Poso.

Therefore, the Action Plan must contain aspects contained in Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning the Establishment of Government Regulations concerning Eradicating Criminal Acts of Terrorism, namely national preparedness, counter-radicalization and deradicalization which are adapted to Poso conditions. Their implementation must include the targets of the radicalization prevention policy expressed by the BNPT, namely the core group or intellectual actors or key figures who recruit people to become militants, militant groups or executors who are trained to carry out terror, supporting groups, namely individuals or groups who voluntarily provide supporting facilities for acts of terrorism, as well as sympathizer groups that have the potential to support terrorist movements.

3. Influence

The deliberation process in radicalization prevention policies in the Poso Regency can be considered influential if the process can make all participants influence each other, and the participants' arguments must be able to influence policymakers. According to Zeeuw et al., (2000), public policies or decisions are the result of orientation interactions between individuals as actors who influence each other so that the resulting policies will form one of the following three types:

- a. Decisions that do not reflect mass participation but are dominated by someone or a small group of influential people who are not competent (dominated orientation of one actor);
- b. Activities/decisions that can/must only be implemented jointly (balance of orientation between actors);
- c. Activities that can be carried out by some members but support the interests of the collectivity (paternalistic domination).

In the radicalization prevention policy in Poso, non-governmental stakeholders do not have a strong influence in formulating public policy. The weak bargaining position of the community can be seen from the presence of community representatives in deliberations who tend to obey decisions made by the regional government of the Poso Regency. In Greenberg and Baron (2000) opinion, people tend to influence others and organizations by carrying out social influence and action in every action or behavior. It is possible to involve power in every social interaction and relationship in an organization. Actors in government have a massive influence on policy formulation because they have resources.

D. Policy Network for Radicalization Prevention

Radicalization prevention policies must reach out to the community against narratives of extremism and support community-based socio-cultural programs, which are seen as able to keep individuals away from radicalization (Kundani and Hayes, 2018). Fung (2003) argues that handling radicalization, namely the presence of community actors, provides more specific information in the context of counter-radicalization. Policy actors consisted of the public, community government, participating under the initiator or opinion leader with pressure from the mass media. A policy network is a relationship formed due to coalitions between governmental actors, society, and private actors (Howlett and Ramesh, 1995, p. 130; Waarden, 1992, pp. 29–52). The relationship between the government and organizations in society forms a policy network as a tool for formulating and making decisions.

1. Dimension of Institutional

Efforts to institutionalize the prevention of radicalization in the Poso Regency area have been regulated in the Decree (SK) of the Regent of Poso Number 188.45/0474/2021 concerning the Formation of an Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict at the Poso Regency Level in 2021 and the actors who are its members, to formulate and implement the Plan Integrated Action for Handling Social Conflict in the Poso Regency Area 2020-2022. These actors include the Poso regional government, Poso Resort Police, Poso Regency Prosecutor's Office, and Military District Commander (Dandim) 1307/Poso.

The communication pattern developed is coordinative and consultative between institutions to discuss handling radicalization in the Poso Regency. However, there is no strategic communication roadmap between institutions, such as a roadmap, guidance, and strategy for achieving security goals in Poso. The level of institutionalization refers to the formal character of the network structure and its stability. Thus, institutionalization will be better if all stakeholders have dynamic institutional relationships and work together to achieve goals.

Law Number 5 of 2018 states that preventing radicalization is carried out through national

preparedness, deradicalization, and counter-radicalization. National preparedness is carried out using early detection and community empowerment. Furthermore, counter-radicalization is a planned, systematic, and continuous process carried out against people or groups of people through counter-narrative, counter-propaganda, and counter-ideology. Meanwhile, deradicalization is an effort to reduce radical activities and neutralize radical ideas for former terrorism convicts and terrorism sympathizers.

The Indonesian National Armed Forces(TNI) and The State Police of the Republic of Indonesia (Polri) have been the most dominant actors in security operations from 2000 to 2023. According to Duyvesteyn (2008, pp. 328–351), there are at least four forms of military use to overcome terrorism. First, the military can assist the police in eradicating terrorism. Second, the military can also be used for preemption against terrorist cells before acts of terrorism occur. Third, the level of radicalization in terrorist groups is not the same: a high level of radicalization means high determination. However, at the level of supporters and sympathizers, they are more susceptible to influence. Fourth, the operation to eliminate key figures of terrorism (targeted killing) is a form of military role (Shultz and Vogt, 2003).

Community involvement in preventing radicalization has been further regulated in Indonesian Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning the Prevention of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and Protection of Investigators, Public Prosecutors, Judges and Correctional Officers, namely:

1. In Article 23, paragraph (2), implementing counter-radicalization, as referred to in paragraph (1), can involve the community. The community involvement is under the coordination of BNPT.
2. In Article 29, paragraph (4), in implementing Deradicalization as referred to in paragraph (3), BNPT involves academics, practitioners, religious leaders, and/or community leaders.

Therefore, non-governmental stakeholders should participate in the radicalization prevention policy process, namely, formulating, making decisions, and implementing programs. According to Waarden (1992), institutionalization will depend on the structural characteristics of the network. Thus, institutionalization will tend to be greater in closed networks, with mandatory membership, regular relationships, high intensity, multiplexity and symmetry of relationships, and leadership that is interconnected with the center.

Each institution needs to build integrated coordination so that it can accommodate all parties' interests in efforts to eradicate terrorism effectively. It confirms that there is no longer a centralized decision-making process (Heclo, 1978). With such a relationship pattern, interest groups on a policy issue have access to the formulation process.

Preventing radicalization in Poso requires a multi-stakeholder institutional model: collaboration between government, civil society, and the private sector. This institutionalization requires a proactive and preventive approach to resolving the problem of radicalism, namely that all parties are directly involved in policy formulation and implementation. Collaborative and communicative coordination between stakeholders is needed. There must be a strategic communication roadmap between institutions for preventing terrorism, integrated data about strategic information, and evaluation results of

handling terrorism so that the public can access complete information about developments in handling terrorism in the Poso Regency.

3. Dimension of Functional

The functional dimension of the counter-radicalism policy in the Poso Regency is a tool used to increase the intensity of relationships between parties interested in the policy. The radicalization prevention policy network in the Poso Regency is a communication medium that takes the form of several functions that depend on access to decision-making, resources, and cooperation between actors. In the dimensional aspect of the function of the radicalization prevention policy network in the Poso Regency, the Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict in Poso Regency consisting of the Poso regional government, the Poso Police, and the Poso Kodim 1370/SM functions as a policy maker and implementer.

According to Waarden (1992), the most common function of policy networks is based on increasing the intensity of relationships, such as:

- a. Access to the decision-making process
- b. Consultation or exchange of information;
- c. Negotiation, namely the exchange of resources and/or performance, resource mobilization;
- d. Coordination for each action to be carried out
- e. Cooperation in policy formulation, implementation, and legitimacy.

Each actor acts based on their respective duties and functions. Information exchange takes place through regional leadership coordination meetings. Meanwhile, the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB), academics, and the Poso former terrorist community were included in interfaith dialogue as social control. Communication between institutions is coordinated and consultative through coordination meetings and interfaith dialogue.

Interaction between actors of the Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict in the Poso Regency through cross-sectoral coordination is in the form of exchanging information and resources owned by each actor, acting as the only actor to formulate and implement the Integrated Action Plan for Handling Social Conflict in the Poso Regency in 2021, providers of human resources and budgets, provide legal considerations, which have the facilities and infrastructure needed to eradicate terrorism. In this case, non-governmental actors are not involved in formulating policy programs. However, the public is given space to provide opinions through meetings and dialogues held by the regional government.

The exchange of information between stakeholders in the Poso Regency occurred through consultation meetings held by the Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict, which presented FKUB, Poso community leaders, traditional leaders, NGOs, academics, and the media. However, the information received is general and does not contain the results of evaluations of budget use or evaluations of the handling of misfire victims by security forces. As the primary agent in efforts to prevent radicalization in the Poso region, the Poso Regency regional government should synergize with all stakeholders by providing the information the community needs clearly and responsibly.

In the exchange of resources aspect, stakeholder resource capabilities in radicalization prevention policies in the Poso district are not the same. BNPT stakeholders and the Integrated Teams for Handling Social Conflict in Poso Regency have human resources, budget, and equipment. Meanwhile, academic actors, the former terrorist community, and FKUB provide information to local governments through deliberations and interfaith dialogue. All actors work together because of the limited resources they have. By working together, hopefully, people can achieve the predetermined goals.

In the policy framework for preventing radicalization in the Poso Regency, the community only functions as policy users who act as a social control over policies. This form of social control can be seen through the community's role in providing criticism and suggestions to the government. It means that even though the community is involved in the policy process, its role is categorized as peripheral. The community is a party that acts as an independent actor and has the qualifications to interact and negotiate with each other in fighting for their interests.

4. DimensionStructure

On the dimensional aspects, the network structure of radicalization prevention policies in Poso includes the network size, type of membership, type of coordination, and nature of the relationships. The type of coordination between BNPT actors and the Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict in Poso Regency is coordinative, an unlimited network of cooperation and communication, mandatory membership status in accordance with the Decree of the Regent of Poso Number 188.45/0474/2021 concerning the Establishment of an Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict at the Poso Regency Level in 2021. Meanwhile, the membership type of non-governmental actors is volunteer and consultancy relationship type. All actors have a cooperative relationship in building relationships.

The structure is an essential part because it can explain the policy network situation. The radicalization prevention policy network in Poso is seen based on the network size, membership type, and coordination type. According to Waarden (1992), policy network structure refers to the relationship pattern between actors. Essential variables in this category are:

- a. Network size, determined by the number of actors;
- b. Boundaries may be open and fluid or closed and monopolistic;
- c. Membership type: voluntary or mandatory participation. It determines whether actors view the network as a problem or an opportunity;
- d. Linkage pattern: chaotic or regular;
- e. Intensity or strength of the relationship, namely the frequency and duration of interactions;
- f. Relations between actors
- g. Interrelated patterns or types of coordination: hierarchical authority, horizontal consultation and bargaining,

- h. The existence of centrality (joint committee), or central unit, namely an organization that focuses on being a policy initiator;
- i. The degree of delegation of decision-making competence to central units and control measures by network participants;
- j. Nature of relationship: conflictual, competitive, or cooperative; stability.

Actor interaction in public policy is an activity that can determine the course of public policy because of the involvement of very strategic actors in the policy process. These actors determine the pattern of policy distribution in the process of interaction and inter-relationships, which tend to be conflictive compared to a harmonious attitude (Madani, 2011).

5. Dimensions of Power Relations

In the dimension of power relations, the authority of non-governmental actors to prevent radicalization in Poso has been regulated in Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Establishment of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication Terrorism Crime. BNPT is in a coordination/consultation relationship with regional governments, the Polri and the TNI, to implement national preparedness, deradicalization, and counter-radicalization programs. Power Relations is an essential component because it shows the distribution of power. The division of power in preventing radicalization in Poso Regency can be seen in Law Number 5 of 2018, which states that the actor acting as the leading sector is BNPT RI using a soft approach, meanwhile Polri take a hard approach to cracking down on perpetrators of terrorism.

Division of powers Article 43A states that national preparedness, as referred to in paragraph (1), is carried out through community empowerment, increasing apparatus capabilities, protecting and improving infrastructure, developing terrorism studies, and mapping areas prone to radical terrorism. The government carries out this National Preparedness under the control of BNPT.

Under Article 3 of Indonesian Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning the Prevention of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and Protection of Investigators, Public Prosecutors, Judges, and Correctional Officers, national preparedness efforts are carried out by the relevant ministries or institutions under the coordination of BNPT. This coordination includes meetings, information data exchange, monitoring, and evaluation. Furthermore, in Article 23 of the Republic of Indonesia Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning the Prevention of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and Protection of Investigators, Public Prosecutors, Judges, and Correctional Officers, the counter-radicalization program is carried out by the ministry, regional government, under the control of BNPT. Counter-radicalization can include communities under BNPT control.

Furthermore, in Article 29 of Republic of Indonesia Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019 concerning the Prevention of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and Protection of Investigators, Public Prosecutors, Judges, and Correctional Officers, it is stated that deradicalization is carried out for suspects, defendants, convicts and convicts of terrorism carried out by ministries, regional governments, prosecutor's office, police, coordinated by

BNPT. This deradicalization can involve academics, practitioners, religious leaders, and/or community leaders.

Meanwhile, Article 30 of Republic of Indonesia Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019, concerning the Prevention of Criminal Acts of Terrorism and Protection of Investigators, Public Prosecutors, Judges, and Correctional Officers, states that deradicalization is carried out for former terrorist convicts, people or groups of people who have been exposed to the radical ideology of terrorism. BNPT conducts it collaboratively with local institutions, governments, the private sector, and the community. However, there are no regulations regarding the role of non-governmental stakeholders in preventing radicalization.

Spalek and Weeks (2017) mention that research on counter-radicalization policies has only focused on the opinions of the government and experts, even though the opinions of the community play an essential role in efforts to fight radicalism. Research on stakeholders or policy actors in public policy networks was carried out by Parsons (1997), who found that policy actors were policy communities consisting of the government and a group of the public who participated under the initiator or opinion leader with pressure from the mass media. A policy network was a relationship formed due to a coalition between governmental, society, and private actors (Waarden, 1992, pp. 29-52); Howlett and Ramesh (1995, p. 130).

6. Dimension of Interest

In the stakeholder interest dimension of the radicalization prevention policy in the Poso Regency, the governmental actors' interests are reflected in the authority granted in accordance with applicable legislation. The actors in the Integrated Team for Handling Social Conflict in Poso Regency members have significant interests, namely public interests related to security and improving community welfare, economic interests, and career development for Polri/TNI personnel.

First, the Poso regional government's interest in preventing radicalization is to create safe conditions for implementing regional development, create economic stability in Poso, and create prosperity for the local community. The Poso government must prepare a strategic communication roadmap for preventing terrorism in Poso, making integrated data on strategic information and evaluation results on handling terrorism accessible to the public.

Second, the interests of the Polri/TNI in security operations using the State Budget (APBN) and Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) of Central Sulawesi Province. The authority of the security apparatus is regulated in Law Number 2 of 2002 concerning the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia and Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning the Indonesian National Armed Forces. Indonesian police actors have great authority in preventing terrorism, prosecuting, and post-terrorism recovery. Implementing security operations in Poso is related to the large budget provided through the APBN and APBD of Central Sulawesi Province.

In the 2021 Central Sulawesi Province APBD stated that the budget for handling terrorism given to the Madago Raya security operations task force in Poso was IDR 3.6 billion. Meanwhile, the budget sourced from the APBN given to Densus 88 in 2022 was IDR 1,500,656,745,000. Meanwhile, the budget for BNPT in 2021 was IDR 385,267,038,000. In

2022, it was IDR 431,174,480,000. In 2023, it was IDR 431.16 billion. The increase in the budget given to BNPT and Polri was in line with the success of BNPT and Polri in uncovering terrorist networks and reducing the level of terrorist attacks in Indonesia. Apart from budgetary interests, there was an interest in increasing the rank of law enforcement officers serving in the Poso area. There were 65 National Police personnel in Central Sulawesi who served in Operation Madago Raya and received promotions in 2021.

However, the Poso people are demanding budget transparency, rehabilitation, and reconstruction of victims of misfires since the Poso security operation took place. In this case, the government should report the results of the evaluation of the implementation of security operations in Poso and the regional government programs contained in the Integrated Action Plan for Handling Social Conflict in the Poso Regency, which then, based on the results of the evaluation will be used as the basis for developing a program to prevent radicalization in Poso on an ongoing basis. Having community involvement in the policy process is a way to ensure accountability (Fischer, 2003) and emphasize legitimacy through consultation.

3. Policy Design For Counter Radicalization


The research results showed that the prevention of radicalization in the Poso Regency had not been implemented optimally. Therefore, cooperation between government and non-governmental stakeholders is needed to implement national preparedness, counter-radicalization, and de-radicalization to realize optimal radicalization prevention policies. Building policy networks with the community to counter-narratives of extremism and supporting community-based socio-cultural programs is seen as being able to keep individuals away from radicalization (Kundani and Hayes, 2018). The function of handling radicalization is the presence of community actors and providing more specific information in the context of counter-radicalization (Lindekilde, 2014; Ragazzi, 2014; Thomas et al., 2020).

In a deliberative perspective of radicalization prevention policy, citizen engagement is individual and collective action designed to identify and address problems of public concern. Public administration institutions are no longer limited to government institutions but can involve other institutions, such as market mechanisms and civil society organizations. Therefore, stakeholder involvement in the Pentahelix perspective is integration between five elements or sectors that work together and are interconnected in the radicalization prevention policy in Poso, namely collaboration between various Academic, Business, Community, Government, and Media sectors. Hopefully, innovation can be realized through synergistic collaboration, supported by various resources that interact synergistically (Abdul et al., 2017).

In the policy of preventing radicalization in Poso, the power center should not be the central part, and the developed coordination pattern should not be a hierarchical authority but a horizontal bargaining. It confirms that there is no longer a centralized decision-making process. This perspective criticizes the single actor (state) concept that has dominated the public policy process. With such a relationship pattern, interest groups on a policy issue have

access to the formulation process. Holdo (2020) mentions that community participation in radicalization prevention policies acts as actors and policy agents who can influence decision outcomes. Agencies involved in radicalization prevention policies make collective and collaborative efforts to accommodate the interests of all parties. Agency is the broadest form of participation, encompassing the possibility of acting in ways that influence the assumptions and constraints involved in participation (Hayward, 2000).

Lindekille (2014) argue that citizens can contribute to effective radicalization prevention policies through cooperation, providing information to the government, and not getting involved with radical groups. In the radicalization prevention program in the Poso Regency, a soft approach is considered the most effective approach to prevent people from joining extremist groups through national preparedness, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization programs that target various vulnerable groups.



4. Conclusion

The radicalization prevention must provides space for the participation of stakeholders outside the government in the formulation and implementation of programs, namely the local wisdom approach so that optimal radicalization prevention policies can be achieved. Meanwhile, to accommodate the interests of the military, Poso district can be designated as a military training area for Polri/ TNI so that it can prevent radicalization in the future. The

government needs to create a road map for strategic communication between institutions as a road map, guidelines and strategies for achieving security goals. Policies to prevent radicalization in Poso require a multi-stakeholder institutional model, namely cooperation between the government and the private sector, community, academia and the media.

Acknowledgment

In this chapter, we would pleased to thank Prof Soesilo Zauhar, MS, Prof Andy Fefta Wijaya, PhD, Dr. Mohammad Nuh, S.IP., M.Si as the Supervisors on this research. Also thanks to Universitas Tanjungpura and Indonesia Endowment Fund For Education Agency (LPDP). The author believes there are still many shortcomings in this manuscript. Thanks to all the people who helped in the research process. Thanks to the journal, hopefully, this manuscript can be published.

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